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Abstract

Deposit insurance is a key issue in bank regulation. A mismatch exists,
especially in the European Economic Area, between the freedom of banks to
operate across borders and the fact that deposit insurance operates on a national
basis. EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland examines the protection of overseas
depositors in the event of a cross-border bank failure. In EFTA Surveillance
Authority, the court examined a state’s responsibility to ensure compensation to
depositors and possible discrimination against foreign depositors. This Article
reviews the paradoxical holding by the court in light of the facts and circumstances
of the case. Further, the Article discusses the concerns raised in EFTA
Surveillance Authority regarding the degree to which EFTA states can adopt
national economic policy arguments to differentiate between domestic and foreign
depositors.
I. Introduction
The organization and design of deposit insurance is one of the core issues in
the regulation of banks. Bank failures during the global financial crisis, exposed
failings in the existing design of deposit insurance. In the context of cross-border
banks, responsibility for the coverage of a banking group is segregated between
different countries and this creates additional complications. Especially within the
European Economic Area (“EEA”), 1 there appears to be a mismatch between the
freedom of banks to operate across borders and the fact that deposit insurance
operates on a national basis.
This Article attempts an exploration of these issues. It begins by examining
the design and operation of deposit insurance in the EEA. The Article continues
by examining a recent case in front of the Court of the European Free Trade
Association (“EFTA”) concerning the protection of overseas depositors, which arose
from one of the most prominent bank failures in the financial crisis. 2 This Article
critically comments on the issues raised by the case and on the reasoning of the
1. The EEA includes, beyond the member states of the European Union, three members of the European
Free Trade Association (“EFTA”): Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
2. Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland, 2013.
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EFTA Court. This Article also considers broader policy issues and potential
long-term implications, which could arise from the approach followed by the EFTA
Court.
In particular, this Article argues that the absence of a high degree of
harmonization of deposit insurance, together with wider policy considerations, has
led the EFTA Court to an approach which may seem paradox taking into account
the actual facts of the case. The reasoning that supports this approach is not
always entirely persuasive. This Article also argues that, while parts of the
judgment may not survive the increasing harmonization of deposit guarantee
schemes in the wake of the financial crisis, broader statements raised by the Court
raise concerns regarding the extent to which EFTA states can invoke national
economic policy arguments to differentiate between domestic and overseas
depositors.
II. The Regulatory Framework: Deposit Insurance in the
European Economic Area
One of the core elements of banking regulation in the EEA is the
“passporting” regime: once banks are authorized in a member state, they can
provide services and establish branches freely throughout the EEA, without the
need to establish local subsidiaries or obtain local authorization. 3 The
“passporting” right reflects the fundamental freedoms of services and
establishment within the EEA as part of the wider objective to create an
integrated, single market.
The bank that establishes a branch or provides services in another state
(“host” state) is principally supervised by the state that authorized the bank
(“home” state). 4 The home state is also responsible to ensure that depositors of
branches within the EEA are covered by a deposit insurance scheme in the home
state, according to the provisions of Directive 94/19 on Deposit Guarantee Schemes
(DGS Directive), 5 as subsequently modified. Under the EEA Agreement, 6 EU
legislation on financial services, including the DGS Directive, is applicable
throughout the EEA.
Under the DGS Directive, EEA member states are obliged to provide deposit
insurance for banks’ branches in other EEA states, without discriminating
between depositors of branches in other member states and depositors in the home
state. 7 According to the DGS Directive, deposit guarantee schemes should cover
deposits up to a certain amount, and repay depositors within a certain timeframe. 8
The DGS Directive provides that, as long as member states ensure that banks
3. Directive 2006/48 Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions, 2006
O.J. (L177) 1–350 (EC), Title III.
4. Id.
5. Directive 94/19 on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes, art. 3, art. 4, 1994 O.J. (L135) 5 (EC) [hereinafter
“DGS Directive”].
6. Agreement on the European Economic Area, Jan. 3, 1994, O.J. (L 1) 3 [hereinafter “EEA Agreement”];
see also EEA Agreement, Ann’x IX (regarding Financial Services).
7. EEA Agreement art. 4; DGS Directive art. 4 and recital 3.
8. DGS Directive, supra note 5, arts. 7, 10. Modifications subsequent to the facts of the case discussed
increased the insured amount (from 20,000 ECU to 50,000 EUR, and subsequently 100,000 EUR) and reduced
the time available for the payout (from three months to twenty days). Further, the insured amount is now
harmonized throughout the EEA, while previously the DGS Directive stipulated only a minimum amount.
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participate in deposit guarantee schemes introduced and recognized according to
the provisions of the directive, it is the deposit guarantee scheme that is liable
against depositors, and therefore potentially subject to actions brought by
depositors, rather than the member state itself and its supervisory authorities. 9
The allocation of responsibility for deposit insurance to the home state
reflects the close link between, first, authorization and supervision of the bank
and its branches—a home state responsibility—and, second, deposit insurance. 10
It also ensures that depositors in the home state and in the host state are protected
by the same deposit insurance scheme 11 and, therefore, subject to equal treatment.
However, the allocation of responsibility for deposit insurance to the home state
also creates the risk that, in the case of a banking crisis, the home member state
may confer a higher level of protection to domestic depositors at the expense of
foreign depositors. This issue was of particular concern to the depositors of foreign
branches of Icelandic banks, which collapsed in the global financial crisis.
In the following sections, this Article considers the EFTA Court’s judgment
with regard to the protection of overseas depositors in the failure of the Icelandic
bank Landsbanki. Iceland, as a member of the EEA, but not of the European
Union, is subject to the jurisdiction of the EFTA Court for matters of EU law.
While judgments of the EFTA Court are not technically binding upon the Court of
Justice of the EU (“CJEU”), the EFTA Court has often examined issues which had
not previously been brought before the CJEU, 12 and the CJEU has referred to
EFTA Court judgments on several occasions. 13 Therefore, the EFTA Court’s
judgments carry considerable weight.
III. The Facts: Icelandic Banking Crisis, Landsbanki Collapse and
Restructuring, and the Fate of Overseas Depositors

EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland 14 arose from the failure of

Landsbanki Islands hf 15 (“Landsbanki”) bank. Iceland authorized Landsbanki.
The bank established branches in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands,
offering online savings accounts, which attracted significant amounts of
deposits. 16 In October 2008, and in the midst of the global financial crisis,
Landsbanki came under significant stress. Within a few days, the online branches
in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands ceased to operate and depositors
lost access to their accounts. Landsbanki collapsed and the Icelandic government
acted under emergency legislation to establish a new bank, New Landsbanki,
where it transferred domestic deposits. 17 The United Kingdom took action to
9. Id. art. 7(6), recital 24.
10. Id. recital 7.
11. Id. recital 3.
12. Note that prior to the Lisbon Treaty (2009) references are made to the European Court of Justice
(ECJ), the current CJEU’s predecessor.
13. Carl Baudenbacher, The EFTA Court Fifteen Years On, in EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA 1992–2009
(2009), available at http://www.eftacourt.int/fileadmin/user_upload/Files/News/2009/15_Years_EFTA
_Court.pdf (studying the relationship between the ECJ and the EFTA court).
14. Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland, 2013.
15. Hlutafelag—This is the corporate designation in Iceland.
16. Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland ¶ 27, 2013.
17. Iceland’s Emergency Act No 125, 2008; Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland ¶ 33, 36 &
38, 2013.
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freeze Landsbanki’s UK assets. 18 The Dutch government also acted under
emergency legislation to wind down the local branch, including its Dutch assets. 19
While the Icelandic depositors of Landsbanki were transferred to the new
bank, the depositors in the UK and Dutch branches were compensated by the UK
and the Dutch deposit guarantee schemes respectively. 20 The UK and the Dutch
deposit guarantee schemes, together with institutional investors and some other
depositors, submitted claims for compensation against the Icelandic deposit
guarantee scheme. 21 After the deadline for repayment by the Icelandic deposit
guarantee scheme expired, the EFTA Supervisory Authority (“ESA”) brought an
action to the EFTA Court seeking a declaration that by failing to repay depositors
in the UK and the Netherlands, Iceland breached its obligation to ensure that
depositors are protected by a deposit guarantee scheme compliant to the
conditions prescribed by the DGS Directive, and also breached its obligation for
nondiscrimination against overseas depositors under the DGS Directive and under
article 4 of the EEA Agreement. 22 The European Commission intervened in
support of the ESA. 23
IV. The Questions in Front of the EFTA Court and the Court’s Judgment
The EFTA Court was called to answer three questions with regard to
Iceland’s behavior to transfer domestic deposits to the new bank and Iceland’s
failure to ensure the timely payment of compensation to depositors in the UK and
Dutch branches of the minimum amount of deposit insurance.
The first question was whether Iceland’s behavior breached its obligations
under Articles 3, 4, 7, and 10 of the DGS Directive. Article 3 of the Directive
requires member states to ensure that deposit-guarantee schemes are introduced
and officially recognized and that authorized banks participate in such schemes. 24
Article 4 of the Directive stipulates that deposit guarantee schemes in a member
state should cover the depositors in branches in other member states, which are
established by banks authorized in the relevant member state. 25 Article 7 of the
DGS Directive (as it stood in 2008) provided for a minimum coverage level of EUR
20,000 for each depositor. 26 Finally, Article 10 provided a time limit of three
months for the repayment of deposits by deposit guarantee schemes, which could
only be extended only in wholly “exceptional circumstances” and “special cases”. 27
The second question was whether Iceland’s behavior discriminated against
depositors in the UK and in the Netherlands in breach of Articles 4(1) and 7(1)
DGS Directive read in the light of Article 4 of the EEA Agreement. Article 4 of the
Under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001. HM TREASURY, The Landsbanki Freezing
NAT’L
ARCHIVES,
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/fin_sta bility_landsbanki.htm.
19. Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland ¶ 39, 2013.
20. Id. at ¶ 42; On the UK response, see HM TREASURY, Icelandic banks: Frequently Asked Questions,
NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/8659.htm.
21. Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland ¶ 49, 2013.
22. Id. at ¶ 61
23. Id. at ¶¶ 64, 66.
24. DGS Directive, supra note 5, art. 3.
25. Id. art. 4.
26. Id. art. 7.
27. Id. art. 10.
18.

Order,
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EEA Agreement is a nondiscrimination clause providing that “any discrimination
on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.” 28 As mentioned above, Article 4(1)
of the DGS Directive provided that deposit guarantee schemes should cover the
overseas branches in other member states. 29 Article 7(1) of the DGS Directive
provided a minimum coverage of EUR 20,000. 30 Read together with Article 4 of
the EEA Agreement, Articles 4(1) and 7(1) of the DGS Directive suggest that the
deposit guarantee scheme should ensure the same treatment between domestic
and overseas depositors in terms of coverage, payout and amount insured.
The third question was whether Iceland’s behavior discriminated against
depositors in the UK and in the Netherlands in breach of the nondiscrimination
clause in Article 4 of the EEA Agreement alone.
The EFTA Court answered all three questions in the negative.
V. The First Question: Responsibility of the State to
Ensure Compensation to Depositors
With regard to the first question, the EFTA Court examined the question
whether the DGS Directive created an “obligation of result” for EEA states. 31 This
means that EEA states would be responsible to ensure that insured depositors
actually receive the amount of compensation prescribed by the Directive. If this
were the case, the state of Iceland would be responsible to ensure that depositors
of the overseas branches of Landsbanki would be repaid on time. Consequently,
Iceland’s failure to ensure the timely repayment of deposits could be held to breach
of Articles 3, 4, 7, 10 of the DGS Directive. In other words, Iceland’s alleged breach
could have been a failure to have deposit guarantee schemes to repay depositors
in branches in host states within three months for a minimum of EUR 20,000.
In order to assess whether the state of Iceland was under the obligation to
ensure repayment of depositors, the Court interpreted the provisions of the DGS
Directive as they stood at the time when the relevant facts took place (2008). 32
According to the Court, the DGS Directive obliged member states to establish
deposit guarantee schemes, and obliged competent authorities to ensure that
banks participate in the schemes and comply with their relevant obligations. 33
However, the DGS Directive left considerable discretion to the member states as
to the organization of the schemes. For instance, the DGS Directive did not refer
to the methods of financing or the size of deposit guarantee schemes, leaving these
issues to be determined by national legislation.
In addition, according to the EFTA Court, the DGS Directive obliged
member states to ensure that national rules were adopted and maintained in order
to cover the insured deposits, and to ensure that depositors have an action against
the deposit guarantee scheme. 34 However, the Court continued, the DGS Directive
28. EEA Agreement, supra note 6, art. 4.
29. DGS Directive, supra note 5, art. 4(1).
30. Id. art. 7(1).
31. Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland ¶ 76, 2013.
32. That is, before the changes introduced by Directive 2009/14 of the European Parliament and of the
Council amending Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes as Regards the Coverage Level and the
Payout Delay, 11 March 2009, O.J. (L 68) 3 (EC) [hereinafter “Amended DGS Directive”].
33. DGS Directive, supra note 5, art. 3(1), art. 3(2)-(5) (discussing art. 3(1) and art. 3(2)-(5), respectively).
34. Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland ¶¶ 141–44, 2013.
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did not oblige member states to ensure the payment of deposit insurance in all
circumstances. 35 At this point, the Court emphasized that the answer might have
been different under the new wording of Article 7(1) of the DGS Directive, which
was replaced by Directive 2009/14. 36 The previous text of the Directive read that
“Deposit-guarantee schemes shall stipulate that the aggregate deposits of each
depositor must be covered . . . .” 37 The new wording reads that “Member States
shall ensure that the coverage for the aggregate deposits of each depositor shall
be . . . .” 38 According to the EFTA Court, under the new wording “[i]t appears that
member states are under an obligation to ensure a certain level of coverage.” 39
However, the Court left the question open, and limited its interpretation to the old
text of the DGS Directive, which was the relevant text for the case in question.
Further, the EFTA Court acknowledged that the DGS Directive obliged
member states to ensure that the deposit guarantee scheme would be able to repay
depositors within the requisite period. 40 However, according to the EFTA Court,
this obligation was limited to creating an effective procedural framework, and did
not require the member state to ensure compensation if funds were unavailable in
the deposit guarantee scheme. 41
In addition to the interpretation of the above Articles, the EFTA Court
examined more generally the spirit and the objectives of the DGS Directive.
According to the Court, the DGS Directive is intended to deal primarily with the
failure of single institutions and not with systemic crises of the magnitude of the
Icelandic crisis. 42 In addition, EFTA Court emphasized that the objective of the
DGS Directive is to create deposit guarantee schemes funded by the banking
industry. 43 Should the funding of the deposit guarantee scheme be insufficient, the
DGS Directive provides that depositors can bring an action against the relevant
scheme. 44 However, the Court continued, the DGS Directive does not envisage any
obligation on the state or a possible action against the state in those
circumstances. 45
Finally, the EFTA Court referred to a number of reasons why, as a matter
of policy, deposit guarantee schemes should not be backed by public funds. In
particular, if member states were responsible to contribute to deposit guarantee
schemes, this could possibly lead to competitive distortions, threaten the stability
of the sovereign itself, and increase moral hazard on behalf of banks or of
depositors. 46 In addition, the EFTA Court added that the Icelandic crisis was an
exceptional case of a systemic crisis of such magnitude, that it would be
inappropriate to hold Iceland liable for the repayment of deposits in the UK and
Dutch branches. 47
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. ¶ 178.
Id. ¶ 139; see also Amended DGS Directive, supra note 32.
DGS Directive, supra note 5, art. 7.
Amended DGS Directive, supra note 32.

Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland ¶ 139, 2013.
DGS Directive, supra note 5, art. 10.
Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland ¶¶ 145–49, 2013.
Id. ¶¶ 150–53.
Id. ¶¶ 155–59.
DGS Directive, supra note 5, art. 7(6).
Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland ¶ 160, 2013.
Id. ¶¶ 162–71.
Id. ¶ 178.
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The Court concluded that Iceland was not liable under the DGS Directive
for failing to ensure that overseas depositors would be repaid on time. 48 Rather,
Iceland’s obligation under the DGS Directive was to establish an effective
framework for deposit guarantee schemes through the adoption and maintenance
of the relevant rules and to ensure that domestically authorized banks
participated in deposit guarantee schemes.
VI. Second and Third Questions: Discrimination
Against Foreign Depositors
As both the second and the third questions had to do with the issue of
nondiscrimination against foreign depositors under Article 4 of the EEA
Agreement, it is worth examining the two questions together. In order to answer
the second and the third questions, the EFTA Court considered whether the fact
that domestic depositors were transferred to a new bank and thus given full
protection, while foreign depositors were not given the same protection,
constituted discrimination, in breach of the DGS Directive and/or Article 4 of the
EEA Agreement.
The EFTA Court emphasized that article 4 and recital 3 of the DGS
Directive, interpreted according to article 4 of the EEA Agreement, require equal
treatment and nondiscrimination between domestic and foreign depositors. 49
Consequently, under the DGS Directive, the deposit guarantee scheme should not
discriminate between domestic and foreign depositors in terms of treatment and
payout. 50
The EFTA Court found that in this particular case, there was no question
of such discriminatory treatment between domestic and foreign depositors.
According to the Court, the transfer of Landsbanki’s domestic deposits to the new
bank was part of bank restructuring under Icelandic emergency legislation, which
Iceland had the discretion to use. 51 The Court also stated that, since domestic
deposits were transferred to the new bank, they never became “unavailable” and
therefore they were not eligible for deposit insurance. 52 The situation was different
regarding deposits in foreign branches, for which the repayment of deposit
insurance was actually triggered. 53 Consequently, according to the Court, there
was no issue of discrimination between domestic and foreign depositors under the
DGS Directive, because the domestic depositors did not even qualify for deposit
protection and therefore were not under the scope of the DGS Directive in the first
place. 54
Finally, the EFTA Court examined the question whether under article 4 of
the EEA alone the transfer of domestic deposits to the new bank would lead to an
obligation to ensure minimum compensation for the foreign deposits. 55 The Court

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.

Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland ¶¶ 206–10, 2013.

Id.
Id. ¶¶ 211–12.
Id. ¶¶ 214–16.
Id. ¶ 212.
Id. ¶ 216.

Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland ¶¶ 218–27, 2013.
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answered this question in the negative. 56 The Court held that the principle of
nondiscrimination under Article 4 of the EEA Agreement could not find a specific
liability on the state of Iceland to ensure the repayment of foreign depositors. 57 In
fact, even if such a specific obligation was deemed to exist, it would not have
established equal treatment between domestic and foreign depositors, given that
the two groups of depositors were in different circumstances. 58 In any case, the
Court reiterated that member states have considerable discretion to deal with
issues of economic policy, including restructuring measures for the banking
sector. 59
VII. Critical Assessment of the EFTA Court’s Judgment

EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland demonstrates that the mismatch
between cross-border operation of banks within the EEA and national
organization of deposit guarantee schemes can create serious problems for
depositor protection in case of a failure of a cross-border bank. Bearing this in
mind, this section critically comments on the judgment of the EFTA Court. In
order to attempt a critical assessment of the EFTA Court’s judgment, it is useful
to distinguish the two principal issues addressed in the judgment.
The first issue was whether a member state is liable under the DGS
Directive to ensure that in effect covered depositors are repaid, even if the funds
of the deposit guarantee scheme are inadequate. As was already mentioned, the
EFTA Court answered in the negative, basing its judgment on legal arguments,
but also taking into account broader policy considerations. The policy
considerations to which the Court referred are particularly strong. More precisely,
holding states responsible for the repayment of depositors would entail using
taxpayers’ money to cover bank losses, and could have a significant impact on the
public budget. Further, the prospect of public funds being used to cover lost
deposits could create moral hazard on behalf of banks and depositors themselves.
For these reasons, the Court was right to emphasize that as a matter of policy it
is important to ensure that depositor protection is not a state liability, but rather
is a liability for deposit guarantee schemes, which are privately funded by the
banks themselves.
The EFTA Court also interpreted the provisions of the DGS Directive and
ruled that member states are not liable to ensure that depositors are actually
repaid according to the provisions of the Directive. In other words, the DGS
Directive does not create an “obligation of result” for member states. The case is
not as simple as it may seem, and the elaborate legal issues that arise in the
interpretation of the DGS Directive deserve closer consideration.
To begin with, the EFTA Court was right to conclude that member states
are not responsible for the obligations of deposit guarantee schemes. The DGS
Directive, its subsequent modifications, 60 and current proposals for a new DGS
Directive (“2010 DGS Directive proposal”) all provide support for the Court’s
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. ¶ 228.
Id. ¶ 226.
Id.
Id. ¶ 227.

DGS Directive, supra note 5, recital 24.
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conclusion. 61 However, the question whether the state should be liable in case the
deposit guarantee scheme does not have the requisite size, organization, or
funding resources to ensure timely repayment, is a different issue. The answer lies
on the margin of national discretion left for deposit guarantee schemes, or, in other
words, the prescriptiveness of state obligations with regard to deposit guarantee
schemes, their size, coverage, and other characteristics. Therefore, the conclusion
of the EFTA Court was reasonable: Iceland should not be liable for the obligations
of its deposit guarantee scheme, merely because the latter was inadequate to cover
depositors, as long as the design of the scheme was within the parameters of the
DGS Directive and within the margin of discretion granted to member states.
However, as discussed later in this section, the EFTA Court’s assessment may lose
in strength in the light of later developments in the EU deposit insurance
framework.
The second main issue decided by the EFTA Court had to do with
discrimination against foreign depositors. This is an issue of manifest importance,
especially in the context of cross-border banking groups. The EFTA Court gave a
narrow interpretation to the nondiscrimination principle. According to the Court,
as long as domestic depositors never qualified for deposit insurance, the transfer
of domestic deposits to the new bank did not constitute discrimination against
foreign depositors, “whether it leads in general to unequal treatment or not”. 62 The
Court’s assessment seems quite paradoxical, given the background facts to the
case. In essence, the end result was that domestic deposits were fully protected,
while deposits in foreign branches were not covered—not even to the minimum
amount prescribed by the Directive. Therefore, it is questionable whether the
Court’s assessment is in accordance with the spirit and the objective of the DGS
Directive. Further, in reaching its conclusion that there was no discrimination, the
Court focused on the technical fact that domestic deposits did not qualify for
deposit insurance because they were transferred to a new bank. In doing so, the
Court appears to accept that member states can de facto side-step the
nondiscrimination principle and engage in preferential treatment of domestic
depositors, by making use of mechanisms under national law, which leave foreign
depositors unprotected.
Finally, the Court concluded its assessment on nondiscrimination by going
further than the issues directly relevant to this case and by making more general
observations with regard to nondiscrimination. In particular, the Court stated
that “the EEA States enjoy a wide margin of discretion in making fundamental
choices of economic policy in the specific event of a systemic crisis provided that
certain circumstances are duly proven.” 63 According to the Court, this discretion
could constitute a ground for justification of the conduct of member states. 64 This
approach raises concerns. Can EEA member states invoke a systemic crisis in
order to take measures which differentiate between domestic depositors and
depositors in foreign branches, potentially preferring the former to the latter? If
this were the case, mutual trust and certainty within the EEA would be eroded.
61. Commission Proposal for a Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes [recast], recital 30, COM (2010)
369 [hereinafter Proposed DGS Directive].
62. Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland ¶ 216, 2013.
63. Id. ¶ 227.
64. Id.
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Depositors may be reluctant to place deposits with branches of banks authorized
in other EEA states, if they are not guaranteed the same protection as domestic
depositors. Especially in case of crisis, depositors may run on branches of foreign
banks, under the fear that they might be left without protection and excluded from
measures taken by the home member state.
VIII. Potential Future Impact of the EFTA Court’s Judgment
This section assesses potential future implications of EFTA Surveillance
Authority v. Iceland, taking into account later reforms in European deposit
insurance legislation. In order to assess the future impact of the Court’s judgment,
it is again worth distinguishing between the two main issues decided by the Court.
The first issue was whether member states are under an obligation to
ensure that depositors are repaid according to the provisions of the DGS Directive.
It was already mentioned that this issue is closely related to the extent of
discretion that member states enjoy with regard to the design of the national
deposit guarantee scheme. The less discretion member states have to organize the
deposit guarantee scheme, the more likely states are to be liable for the repayment
of depositors, should the scheme fail to comply with the requirements prescribed
in EU law. The old text of the Directive considered in EFTA Surveillance Authority
v. Iceland left wide discretion to member states. However, amendments to the
DGS Directive in 2009 significantly curtailed this national discretion. In
particular, Directive 2009/14 harmonized the amount insured, reduced
significantly national discretion in many areas, and mandated deposit guarantee
schemes to cooperate with each other. 65 This means that it is possible that in the
future, member states could be held liable for the obligations of deposit guarantee
schemes, should the latter fail to comply with the provisions of the DGS Directive.
This possibility was acknowledged by the EFTA Court in its judgment. 66
Notably, even more radical changes to the deposit insurance framework are
in the pipeline. The 2010 DGS Directive proposal further restricts the discretion
that member states have with regard to the design of deposit guarantee schemes.
In particular, the 2010 proposal specifies the funding mechanisms for deposit
guarantee schemes and the target levels for the size of the schemes. According to
the 2010 proposal, deposit guarantee schemes should be funded through
proportional bank contributions according to risk-based elements. 67 The 2010
proposal contains provisions for enhanced cooperation between deposit guarantee
schemes at cross-border level. More specifically, the proposal envisages a system
by which the host scheme would repay local depositors on behalf of the home
scheme, as well as mutual lending facilities between national schemes. According
to the 2010 proposal, member states would be obliged to ensure that schemes do
not deviate from the coverage level stipulated by the DGS Directive. 68 While it
remains to be seen which of these initiatives will reach the final directive, 69 it can
65. Amended DGS Directive, supra note 32, art. 4(5), art. 7(1a).
66. Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland ¶¶ 138–39, 2013. However, as already mentioned,
the Court left the issue open, as it was not relevant to the facts of this case.
67. Proposed DGS Directive, supra note 61, at 7.5.
68. Id.
69. At the time of writing (May 2013), the 2010 proposal has been under considerable delay and is still
in consultation phase.
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be said with reasonable certainty that the new framework for deposit guarantee
schemes will further reduce national discretion. This will trigger calls to
reconsider whether member states should be liable when they fail to comply with
such prescriptive obligations as to the design and funding of the schemes.
More broadly, the EU system for deposit insurance could change radically
in the future. If deposit guarantee schemes cease to be national at some point in
the future, EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland would then be of little
relevance. The creation of a pan-European single scheme is not an entirely
improbable development, although unlikely in the near future. 70 A more plausible
scenario is that in the future a single deposit guarantee scheme could be created
for the member states of the Euro Area, and possibly other EEA member states,
which choose to opt into such an arrangement. 71 Any of these scenarios would call
for re-thinking state liability in cases of insufficient funding for a cross-border
scheme; the answer would greatly depend on the organization chosen for such a
scheme.
The second main issue considered by the EFTA Court was the issue of
nondiscrimination between domestic and foreign depositors. Given that the
relevant provisions with regard to nondiscrimination in the DGS Directive and the
EEA Agreement have not changed and no changes are currently proposed, the
EFTA Court’s analysis on this issue is more likely to remain relevant in the future.
According to the EFTA Court’s judgment, it appears that in a banking crisis,
member states could transfer deposits to a new bank, as Iceland did, resulting in
differential, but nondiscriminatory, treatment of domestic and foreign depositors.
Further, the Court emphasized that “EEA States enjoy a wide margin of discretion
in making fundamental choices of economic policy in the specific event of a
systemic crisis.” 72 Should this approach be followed in the future, there is a risk
that member states could call upon economic policy or financial stability
considerations and differentiate between domestic and foreign depositors.
Notably, some comfort could be drawn by the fact that current proposals for
a Directive on Bank Recovery and Resolution reduce discretion of member states
as to the mechanisms they can employ in a banking crisis. 73 Therefore, the EFTA
Court’s reasoning with regard to broad national discretion when dealing with a
systemic crisis may not hold strong in the future, in the light of increasing EU
harmonization in the field of bank recovery and resolution. Finally, if deposit
insurance schemes are created at cross-border level at some point in the future,
deposit insurance would no longer be a matter for member states. It can
reasonably be expected that cross-border deposit guarantee schemes could ensure
70. The 2010 DGS Directive proposal by the Commission did not put forward the creation of a
pan-European deposit guarantee scheme, but left the issue to be discussed at a later stage.
71. This is one of the main proposals in the context of the “banking union”, a move to centralize powers
on the banking sector within the Euro Area at European level. See Memorandum from the European Comm’n
on the Banking Union (June 6, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=MEMO/12/413&. The first step towards the banking union is the creation of a single supervisory
mechanism. See Eilis Ferran & Valia Babis, The European Single Supervisory Mechanism (Univ. of
Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 10, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2224538.
72. Case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland ¶ 227, 2013.
73. See Commission Proposal For a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
Establishing a Framework For the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms,
COM (2012) 280/3. At the time of writing (May 2013), the Proposal is still at consultation stage, with the vote
in the European Parliament scheduled for October 23, 2013.
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a uniform treatment of depositors at cross-border level, and therefore significantly
reduce the probability of differential treatment between domestic and foreign
depositors.
IX. Concluding Remarks
To conclude, EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland demonstrates serious
gaps in the EU’s legislative framework as well as lack of cross-border cooperation
in deposit insurance and bank restructuring. As this Article has discussed, some
of these gaps have already been addressed in legislative reforms after the relevant
facts for this case took place. However, this Article also discussed that if the
intention is to ensure uniform treatment of depositors within the EEA, much
remains to be done. The most fundamental reforms in EU legislation with regard
to deposit insurance, recovery, and resolution have been significantly delayed and
are still pending. Unless the legal framework for deposit insurance is reformed to
deal with banks at cross-border rather than national level, the implications of
deposit insurance segregated along national lines could be severe for banking
integration in the European Economic Area.

Vol. 2, Fall 2013

12

